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Abstract  
Defense and Aerospace Systems Acquisition projects, just like any other Large-Scale Complex Engineered Systems 
(LSCES) experience delays and cost overrun during the acquisition process. Cost overrun and delays in LSCES are 
due, in part, to high complexity, size of the project, involvement of various stakeholders, organizations, political 
disruptions, changes in requirements and scope. These uncertainties, due to the exogenous factors, have cost the 
federal government billions of dollars and delays in completion of the programs. Cost estimation of federal programs 
is usually based on previous generations of systems produced and almost all the time the costs are underestimated. 
Underestimation of the cost of the programs is an endogenous factor, which results in cost overrun for any program, 
the behavior of the cost escalation is pre-forecasted to be normally distributed, but due to the cost overrun, the cost 
escalation curve may be skewed. In this paper, the authors will be studying the cost escalation and time delays of the 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), a DoD’s space acquisition program. The distribution of the cost and 
time can aid in understanding the effects of endogenous factors influencing the cost overrun and the effect of change 
in requirements during the acquisition process. This data will serve as a foundation for further research to create a 
framework, which will be used, in better forecasting of the cost of the acquisition of the programs. 
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Introduction 
A system, which in complex in nature with many stakeholders, interacting and coupled system is a Large-Scale 
Complex Engineered System (LSCES) (Deshmukh & Collopy, 2010). These systems are associated with high cost 
and high risk due the complexity and numerous interactions with people spanning across the world working in 
numerous geographic locations and organizations (Lewis & Collopy, 2012; Shapiro & Lorenz, 2000). One such system 
is the Defense weapon acquisition system or Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). There are various 
complexities in defense system such as technological complexity, managerial or organizational complexity, business 
system complexity, coupling of the systems, cognitive complexity, number of parts, lines of code and many more 
(Bloebaum, Collopy, & Hazelrigg, 2012) (Spero, Bloebaum, German, Pyster, & Ross, 2014).  
The defense acquisition programs include weapons, aircrafts, ships, space acquisitions and so on.  It is so 
often seen that such highly complex systems have higher costs and schedule overrun exceeding to more than 40% of 
their initial costs (Deshmukh & Collopy, 2010). For example, a comparison of complexity, in terms of number of parts 
and lines of code, with the schedule time in Exhibit 1 by former director of the DARPA Tactical technology office 
Paul Eremenko shows the escalation of schedule for aerospace industry (Eremenko, 2009).  The exhibit also shows 
the escalation comparison of the aerospace industry with the automobile and integrated circuits industry. The 
aerospace industry’s cost increases by 8-12% every year whereas the automobile industry and the integrated circuits 
industry’s costs increase by 4% and 0.1% respectively. The increase of cost in the aerospace industry every year causes 
the cost to grow at least twice the estimated costs by the end of the program due to longer schedules and high 
complexity of the system produced (Eremenko, 2009).  
 
2 
Copyright, American Society for Engineering Management, 2018 
 
Exhibit 1. Historical trend of Complexity and Schedule of Adaptive systems (Eremenko, 2009) 
 
 
For any defense acquisitions, once the initial capabilities of the system are established, DoD calls out for 
proposals from participating contractors for their best offers for the program. Contracting is awarded by negotiating 
using tradeoffs and lowest price or performance-based contracting (G. V. Bhatia, 2016; G. V. Bhatia, Kannan, & 
Bloebaum, 2016) and have different contracting structures. The cost of acquisition systems is based on previous 
generations of similar systems and yet there seem to be cost overruns. The interpretation of such cost overrun is usually 
underestimation of the program, which is an exogenous factor. The cost overrun of the system is also dependent on 
various other factors like exogenous and endogenous. Exogenous factors are factors not belonging to the system and 
endogenous are factors which are within the realm of the program. Both factors play a major role in the cost and 
schedule overrun and this is validated by data of DoD programs (Collopy & Consulting, 2007; Deshmukh & Collopy, 
2010; Maddox, Collopy, & Farrington, 2013). The authors in this paper try to prove the hypothesis that endogenous 
factors such as complexity, requirements and technical risks play an important role in the cost overrun of the program. 
For a LSCES, the stakeholders present in the decision making of the system and numerous interactions 
between the different systems within the system, causes change scope. There are various reasons for the delays and 
cost overrun for a system with the major factor being the design errors, change in scope, complexity of the system, 
exogenous factors such as natural disasters, political dynamics, warfare, scientific world and other factors not related 
to the system. This is the same for Defense programs as well. In this paper the authors analyze a space program, 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite program, to find the different factors which lead to the cost 
and schedule overrun. The data will be used a background for further research to create a framework which will be 
used along with value-based modelling to reduce the cost and schedule overruns. 
 
Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition Process 
All military goods, services from contractors, federal arsenals, ships, satellites, aircrafts and any system for military 
operations are acquired by the Department of Defense. Acquisition of a system can be defined as the purchase of an 
item or service for the system. Any system acquired by the DoD should undergo the acquisition process which involves 
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the design, engineering, construction, testing, deployment, sustainment and disposal of the system and is highly 
complex (Schwartz, 2014). 
For any weapon, information tech or advancement of previously used system or a new system, the DoD has 
three established organized systems to identify, plan, develop and dispose them. The systems with their responsibility 
are provided in Exhibit 2. 
 
Exhibit 2. Systems involved in DoD Acquisition Process (Schwartz, 2016) 
System Acronym Function 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System 
JCIDS Identifies the 
requirements 
The Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution System 
PPBE Allocation of 
resources and 
budgeting 
The Defense Acquisition System DAS Developing and 
buying an item 
 
The first step for buying a system, say a weapon, is identifying the requirements for it. The Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) achieve this requirement process and it identifies, assesses, and 
prioritizes what capabilities are required by the military. JCIDS ensures capabilities required by the joint warfare to 
be identified along with the requirements to successfully execute the mission. Budgeting and planning the process of 
development of the system is the next step toward the success of the program and it is monitored by the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBE). The next step is the acquisition process, which is the 
management part of the defense program. The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) oversees the acquisition process 
by using phases and milestones. At each milestone, the program should meet specific requirements before proceeding 
to the next phase of the acquisition process. There are five phases in DAS, and at the end of each phase is a milestone 
review and there are three milestone reviews A, B, C (Schwartz, 2014).  
The first phase is the Material Solution Analysis (MSA) phase, which assesses different solutions for the 
required capability for the program. The second phase is the Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase 
where the technologies for the program is integrated into the system by reducing the technology risk and life cycle 
cost risk.  The third phase is Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) where the system undergoes design 
and development before going into production. The fourth phase is Production and Deployment (PD) where the system 
is produced and tested for the operational capability of the system in the program. The fifth phase is Operations and 
Support (O&S) which supports the use of the system in the field and maintains it until the end of the program. The 
Defense Acquisition process along with the phases and Milestone is shown in the exhibit 3 (Schwartz, 2014). 
 
Exhibit 3. DoD Acquisition Process 
 
 
 
DoD Cost Estimating Process 
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For any program to be completed within a given time, the program requires resources and funds, which need to be 
allocated. Estimation of the cost of a program is very important as it serves as constraint or a decision-making point 
to develop a project. Cost estimating involves collecting and analyzing historical data using quantitative models to 
predict the cost (McBride, 2010). For a DoD Acquisition program, cost estimation provides a basis for funding 
decision, annual budget requests, make key point decision, contracting the program to organizations, and many other 
reasons. The DoD has two main cost estimation categories namely, Life-Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) and Business 
Case Analysis (BCA). DoD uses the LCCE for a program to determine cost of categories and elements in the system. 
LCCE has four major cost categories: Research and development costs, investment costs, operations and support costs, 
and disposal costs. The profile of the costs for a DoD program is depicted in Exhibit 4. To avoid the cost overrun of 
the DoD programs to exceed excessively high, the government uses the Nunn McCurdy Act to report the cost 
overshoot to the congress to make necessary changes to the program.  
 
Exhibit 4. LCCE of a  DoD Program 
 
 
Nunn McCurdy Amendment 
The Nunn McCurdy Amendment, was introduced by Senator San Nunn and congressional representative Dave 
McCurdy, to reduce and control the cost overruns in the Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP). This 
amendment requires the DoD to report the cost overrun of the MDAP when it exceeds certain limits sets by the DoD  
(Schwartz, 2016). The cost increase is represented as breaches in the Nunn McCurdy Act. There are two breaches 
Significant Breach and Critical breach. The Significant Breach occurs when the cost overrun of MDAP is more than 
15% of the current baseline or 30% of the original baseline estimate. The Critical Breach occur when the cost overrun 
of MDAP is 25% of the current baseline or 50% of the original baseline estimate 
At the event of Significant breach, the program manger must notify Congress with report for unit cost and reasons 
for increase in cost, completion status of the program, changes in the projected cost and the actions to control the cost 
growth. Critical breach requires more justification of the costs as there is a possibility of the program being terminated. 
Root-Cause analysis is used to determine the different factors of the cost growth by the Secretary of the Defense and 
also asses the new estimated cost of the program with changes in requirement and reasonable alternatives.  The 
program is not terminated if the programs meets certain requirements such as the program being essential for national 
security, new cost estimates are reasonable, the cost growth can be controlled by the management. The program should 
also be restructured in a manner that it adheres to address the root-cause analysis, change milestones and receive new 
milestone approvals (Schwartz, 2016).  
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DoD Space Acquisitions 
The space systems provide critical capabilities, which support military and other government operations. Like any 
other LSCES, the space systems are highly complex and development and launching of it takes a long time. DoD 
follows the same process of Defense Acquisition system to acquire space programs (Maddox et al., 2013). Major DoD 
space programs have experienced momentous increases in cost and schedule resulting in the program to undergo Nunn 
McCurdy breaches. One such program is the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program, which had 
communication satellites for the Air force. The cost overrun for AEHF exceeded 118% of the initial costs estimated 
(Chaplain, 2017). The status of the Major defense Space Programs and their current and estimated costs are provided 
in Exhibit 5. 
Exhibit 5. DoD Space Acquisition Programs (Chaplain, 2017) 
DoD Space Acquisition Status Original 
Program Cost 
Current Total 
Program Cost 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
(AEHF) 
Production & Deployment $6.9 Billion $15 Billion 
Enhanced Polar System (EPS Production & Deployment $1.4 Billion $ 1.4 Billion 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Production & Deployment $18.8 Billion $59.6 Billion 
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of -
sight Terminals (FAB-T) 
Production & Deployment $1.7 Billion $1.8 Billion 
Global Positioning System (GPS) III Production & Deployment $4.3 Billion $5.8 Billion 
Global Positioning System Next 
Generation Operational Control 
System (GPS OCX) 
Engineering & 
Manufacturing 
Development 
$3.6 Billion $5.5 Billion 
Joint Space Operations Center 
Mission Systems (JMS) Increment 2 
Engineering & 
Manufacturing 
Development 
$320 Million $469.9 Billion 
Military GPS User Equipment 
(MGUE) Increment 1 
Engineering & 
Manufacturing 
Development 
$0.7 Billion $1.1 Billion 
Mobile User Objective System 
(MUOS) 
Production & Deployment $7.3 Billion $7.4Billion 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Production & Deployment $5.0 Billion $19.2 Billion 
Space Fence Ground – Based System 
Increment 1 
Engineering & 
Manufacturing 
Development 
$1.6 Billion $1.6 Billion 
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) Production & Deployment $1.3 Billion $4.3 Billion 
 
From the Exhibit, it is seen that the initial estimated cost of the program is lower than the current program. 
This can be due to numerous risk factors and uncertainty involved in the program. The data of the DoD space 
acquisition program will provide a background for further research on incorporating various complexity in terms of 
technical, organizational, couplings, parts, system to reduce the cost and schedule overrun in major space acquisition 
programs.  In this paper the authors choose the AEHF satellite program to study the changes in costs, quantities and 
requirements from the start of the programs until the end of 2017 through the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) and 
Government Accountability Office Reports.  
 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite program consists of communication satellites and it is operated by the 
United States Air Force Space Command to replace the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) satellite 
systems and to improve the tactical communication capabilities of the older version of MILSTAR satellite 
(Management, 2017). These communication satellites operate at extremely high frequency of 44GHz for Uplink and 
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20 GHz for downlink. The acquisition program was started in the year 1999, the contracts were awarded in 2001 to 
Lockheed Martin Space Systems and Northrop Grumman Space Technology, and the first launch of the satellites was 
expected to be in 2006.  
The acquisition program is reported every year by the Government Accounting Office (GAO). This report 
states the different changes in the schedule, cost and requirement of the AEHF communications satellite. The costs 
are segregated in terms of research & development costs, procurement costs, total program costs and the unit cost 
along with the quantities. Initially the AEHF program was supposed to launch five satellites but due to the challenges 
in the technology, the number of satellites were reduced to 3 in 2002 (Acquisitions, 2003). The estimated costs of 
AEHF from the year of proposal till 2017 is provided in Exhibit 6 (Acquisitions, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). 
 
Exhibit 6. AEHF Estimated Costs (Base Year & Then Year) 1999- 2015 
 
 
The change in costs during the development of AEHF are due to various requirement changes, technical 
errors, human errors and other factors. The different errors and changes occurred due to the various exogenous and 
endogenous factors of AEHF are listed below in the Exhibit 7 of the paper. 
 
Exhibit 7. Change in AEHF from GAO Reports (Acquisitions, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) 
Year Type of Change Change Reason 
2002 Requirement  Quantity reduced to 3 from 5 Integration of new Transformational Satellite 
Communications System (TSAT) 
2003 Technical  Cost growth & Schedule Delay AEHF Comsec/Transec System (ACTS) 
architecture change and requirement change 
in the system 
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2003 Security  Separate Foundries to produce 
chips 
Technically challenging fabrication process 
2004 Technical Cost growth & Schedule Delay 
& Nunn Mc Curdy Breach 
Delay in ACTS delivery and concurrent 
development of two critical path items 
2005 Schedule Revised Dates Significant Nunn McCurdy Breach  
2006 Technical Schedule Delay Delay in delivery of Command Post Terminal  
2007 Technical Cost growth & Schedule Delay Hardware components incomplete in payload 
2008 Schedule Revised Dates Critical Nunn-McCurdy breach 
2008 Requirement Increase in quantity 3 satellites were added  
2009 Requirement TSAT Termination Procurement of 3 additional satellites 
 
The first satellite of AEHF program, AEHF-1 was launched 4 years behind the expected launch date in 2010 
and the satellites 2 and 3 were launched in 2012 and 2013 respectively (Management, 2017).  In 2008, the Defense 
Appropriations Act recommended a fourth satellite, but the cost of building was projected to $1.5 Billion which is 
almost twice the estimated cost of the third satellite $952 Million. From Exhibit 7, it is seen that endogenous factors 
such as technical changes and complexity in the satellite hardware has led to cost overrun and schedule delays. The 
AEHF program has undergone two Nunn McCurdy breaches in the year 2004 and 2008. The 2004 breach was due to 
the schedule and cost increase by 15% of the baseline and a critical breach in 2008 when the unit cost exceeded 130% 
of the initial costs (Management, 2017). From the above data the hypothesis that endogenous mechanisms are 
responsible to cost overrun than the exogenous cost overrun. This data will serve as a background for further research 
in terms of management complexity, decision making.  
 
Summary 
DoD acquisition of programs is prone to a lot of risk and uncertainty due to the complexity of the system, change in 
requirements and interactions between different organizations and governments. The consequences of risk and 
uncertainty leads to increase in cost and time of the acquisition of the program. The Nunn-McCurdy amendment keeps 
in check of the cost overrun and the acquisition program may or may not be terminated depending on the significance 
of it on the defense sector. It is believed that the cost and schedule overrun are due to the underestimation of the costs 
which is an exogenous factor. n this paper, the authors utilize the different unclassified data from SAR and GAO to 
understand the occurrence of cost overrun of AEHF, a space acquisition program. It is seen that endogenous factors 
such as lack of technical tests had led to the cost and schedule overrun of the AEHF.  
 
Future Work 
The AEHF show the technical risk, uncertainty in requirement which are endogenous to the system are responsible 
for cost overrun. The next step is finding other endogenous factors such as management type of the organization and 
the management of the acquisition. DoD uses Earned Value Method for cost estimation and is also used as 
management tool of the program. The authors will study the EVM process and find the factors which affect the 
acquisition program and also the different contracting method involve in it. Another government agency which 
acquires space systems is NASA. NASA’s space acquisition program uses Joint Confidence Limits (JCL) to estimate 
the cost of the program. JCL will be used to compare the cost estimation of DoD’s acquisition programs.  The 
difference of using NASA’s JCL to the DoD’s cost estimating process will also be studied to understand the 
underlaying issues. These data will serve as a background to construct a new framework involving systems 
engineering, value-based modelling, decision analysis and microeconomics which will reduce the cost and schedule 
overrun of the system. 
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